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NO. 28 JULY 2018 Introduction 
Kremlin Launches Risky Pension Reform 
Plan to Raise Retirement Age Undermines Confidence in Russian Leadership 
Janis Kluge 
On 14 June, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev announced proposals to gradually raise 
the retirement age in Russia from 2019. The Russian leadership wants to use this re-
form to tighten its budget and boost economic growth. Despite the media distraction 
caused by the Football World Cup, there is growing protest against the proposal. 
Trade unions, loyal opposition and Alexei Navalny are planning demonstrations. The 
Kremlin has framed the unpopular reform as a government project that President 
Putin has nothing to do with. Nevertheless, confidence in the President has been 
dented. A clear social response could lead to a weakening of the reform and although 
the Kremlin has many instruments at its disposal to stem the threat of protests, it 
lacks the means to regain the trust it has lost. 
 
On the opening day of the Football World 
Cup, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev 
announced two unpopular bills. The retire-
ment age for women was to rise from 55 to 
63 years, and for men from 60 to 65 years. 
In a transitional phase, the retirement age 
would be increased by six months each year 
from 2019. In addition, Medvedev announced 
an increase in sales tax from 18 percent 
to 20 percent in early 2019. This was to 
finance an investment programme man-
dated by President Putin when he took 
office in May 2018. Medvedev said that 
future monthly pension payments would 
increase by around 1,000 rubles (14 euros) 
each year. The first reading of the bill in 
the Duma is expected on 19 July. The re-
form could be adopted in autumn 2018 and 
signed by Putin in the same year. Before the 
presidential election, it was still taboo for 
the Russian government to publicly address 
raising the retirement age, although it had 
long been a topic of discussion among 
experts. Now Dmitry Medvedev is urging 
swift action, suggesting there is no more 
time for theoretical debates. 
The reform does not affect all Russians 
equally. Already in 2017, the government 
began to raise the retirement age for civil 
servants to 63 for women and 65 for men. 
The police, security services and military 
have their own regulations: in most cases, 
staff are entitled to a pension after 20 years 
of service. This privilege remains unaffected 
by the reform plan. 
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Easing pressure on the budget 
and the economy 
By raising the retirement age, the Kremlin 
hopes to stabilize the Russian pension sys-
tem. In 2017, the Ministry of Finance had 
to spend almost a quarter of its federal 
budget (4 percent of GDP) on supporting 
the pension fund – and this figure is 
rising. In times of low oil prices, that is a 
major burden. 
In the Russian pay-as-you-go system, 
there are increasingly fewer contributors 
paying in and increasingly more pensioners 
receiving payments. This is due to historical 
fluctuations in the birth rate. Since a par-
ticularly large retirement cohort has retired 
in recent years, the number of Russian pen-
sioners has risen from 39.1 million to 43.5 
million since 2010 (30 percent of the Rus-
sian population). At the same time, only a 
very small cohort is entering the labour 
market. As a result, the number of working-
age Russians has fallen by around one mil-
lion every year for the last three years. 
Raising the retirement age is intended to 
prevent the gap in the pension fund from 
continuing to widen in the 2020s. 
The economy should also benefit from 
the reform thanks to a larger supply of 
labour. Businesses can only partially com-
pensate for the shortage of young workers 
by increasing productivity. Although net 
immigration to Russia is over 200,000 
people per year, migrants are mostly em-
ployed in unqualified jobs. Raising the 
retirement age will not solve the shortage 
of labour, but working longer could reduce 
the deficit by around one third by 2030 
(from 3.8 million to 2.5 million). According 
to forecasts, Russian economic growth in 
the 2020s would be half a percentage point 
higher as a result of the pension reform. 
However, the reform also harbours eco-
nomic and social risks. In Russia, pension-
ers traditionally play a major role in child-
care. If this support for young families were 
no longer available, fewer mothers would 
be able to participate in the labour market, 
resulting in an additional loss of young 
workers. 
At the local level, the pension reform 
might even cause unemployment to rise. 
Older Russians are already having difficulty 
finding work or just keeping their jobs, 
even though official unemployment is very 
low at a national average of 5.2 percent. 
They cannot directly replace the lack of 
younger workers, but perform complemen-
tary tasks. The older Russians were trained 
in the Soviet Union, have more technical 
expertise and work more frequently in stag-
nating sectors, such as industry or agricul-
ture. Among younger workers, there are 
more lawyers, economists and computer 
scientists working in the growing service 
sector. 
Substantial majority against 
reform 
According to a recent survey conducted by 
Russian pollsters, 92 percent of Russians 
are opposed to raising the retirement age. 
Many Russians fear material losses. The 
reform will noticeably lower the standard 
of living of older workers and indirectly 
affect younger families as well. Given their 
low life expectancy, the issue of intergener-
ational fairness impacts Russian men, in 
particular. In Russia, only 57 out of 100 
men will reach the new retirement age of 
65. Overall, life expectancy has risen to 71.9 
years of age, but in some regions the figure 
for men is still below 60. 
Secondly, the retirement ages of 55 and 
60 are still of great symbolic importance in 
Russia today as a social achievement of the 
Soviet Union. The low retirement age made 
Russians realize they were better off than 
their neighbours in the other successor 
states of the Soviet Union. Apart from Rus-
sia, only the demographically very young 
Uzbekistan has still retained the old pen-
sion formula. 
Thirdly, the reform contradicts an old 
but firm promise made by the Kremlin. 
In 2005, President Vladimir Putin made it 
unmistakably clear that he would never 
raise the retirement age, and he has re-
peatedly affirmed this guarantee since. His 
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promise is captured in video clips current-
ly circulating on the Internet in Russia. 
Through his spokesman, Vladimir Putin has 
said he was not involved in developing the 
bill on pension reform. Nonetheless, ac-
cording to polls, confidence in the Russian 
President has fallen to its lowest level since 
December 2011. 
Survey: Confidence in Vladimir Putin, 
2006–2018 (% of respondents) 
Source: Russian Public Opinion Research Center 
(VCIOM), https://wciom.ru/news/ratings/doverie_ 
politikam/. 
Competition for protesters 
In the first few days after Medvedev’s 
announcement, dozens of demonstrations 
against the pension reform were registered 
across Russia. Behind the planned protests 
are the Russian trade unions, mostly loyal 
opposition parties and opposition activist, 
Alexei Navalny. Since the reform plans 
were announced at the beginning of the 
Football World Cup, those living in the 
largest cities were not able to demonstrate 
immediately. The right of assembly was 
severely restricted in those regions with 
Football World Cup venues until 25 July 
2018. However, on 1 July 2018, 45 mostly 
small Russian cities that were not World 
Cup venues held demonstrations; only a 
few attracted more than 1,000 participants. 
It was initially surprising that Russian 
trade unions most actively opposed the 
reform immediately after its announce-
ment. In the past, Russia’s largest trade 
union federation, the Federation of In-
dependent Trade Unions of Russia, has 
supported the United Russia party and 
Vladimir Putin. It has never played an in-
dependent political role, despite claiming 
to have more than 25 million members. 
In this respect, it is hard to imagine that 
the unions will become a serious opponent 
to the Kremlin on pension reform. Rather, 
their protest gives the Russian leadership 
the chance to steer the displeasure of the 
people into controllable channels. 
That actors close to the Kremlin are 
trying to seize the potential for protest, 
runs largely counter to the intentions of 
opposition activist, Alexei Navalny, who 
also wants to mobilize protest against the 
pension reform. In 2017, Navalny proved 
that he could organize nationwide protests 
through a large network of volunteers. 
The demonstrations attracted many young 
Russians. By organizing protests against the 
pension reform, Navalny can hope to be-
come better known in other milieus as well. 
Last year, Navalny enriched his programme 
of anti-corruption policies with socio-popu-
list demands. So far, however, he has had 
little success in trying to integrate social pro-
tests into his movement. On the one hand, 
any proximity to Navalny is dangerous 
for organizers of other protests because it 
results in greater state repression. On the 
other hand, many social protests are hoping 
for the Kremlin to step in rather than call-
ing for political change. 
Dealing with social protests 
The number of social protests in Russia 
increased significantly after the economic 
crisis of 2015–2016. Policies that sparked 
protest included increasing fees for public 
utility services and businesses missing salary 
payments. Regional and federal authorities 
responded with a mixture of sabotage, dis-
creditation and repression. In many cases, 
demonstration organizers were prosecuted 
and sent to prison. However, attempts at 
dialogue and individual concessions are 
some of the tactics the Russian government 
will also adopt, as long as the interests 
of the elite remain unaffected. Almost all 
social protests have remained local and 
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short-lived. Only in very few cases have 
protests developed into lasting movements, 
e.g. against hazardous landfill sites or the 
introduction of a lorry toll. 
The last major Russia-wide social protests 
took place in 2005 when concessions for 
pensioners – such as free use of local trans-
port – were to be converted into cash pay-
ments. The Kremlin refused to back down 
on the unpopular reform plan but, as a 
result of the protests, avoided noticeable 
cuts in pensions for many years. If the in-
crease in the retirement age produces a 
similar wave of protests, the Kremlin is 
likely to concede its position. Putin could 
present himself as the advocate of the 
people who defies government technocrats 
by demanding longer transition periods or 
a lower target age. It would also be possible 
to postpone the reform, although this 
would pose a risk to national finances. The 
Kremlin could finance the overspend from 
the National Welfare Fund until Putin’s 
current term ends in 2024. 
Outlook 
No unpopular reforms have been imple-
mented in Russia since the mid-2000s. 
However, a stagnant economy and demo-
graphic developments are putting the 
Kremlin under pressure. Its state paternal-
ism can no longer be financed as it once 
was. Increasing the retirement age raises 
fears among many Russians that the gov-
ernment might withdraw even further from 
its social obligations. The Kremlin’s silence 
on the reform, which is to come into force 
within the next few months, prior to the 
election has further fuelled these fears. 
Only after the protest restrictions are 
lifted in late July will it become apparent 
how many people are prepared to take to 
the streets and protest the pension reform. 
Fewer Russians took part in the first pro-
tests in smaller cities than polls suggest. 
The next opportunity for Russians to ex-
press their displeasure at the ballot box 
will be next autumn’s Single Election Day: 
on 9 September 2018, new governors will 
be directly elected in 22 regions. At the 
federal level, the next Duma elections are 
not until 2021. 
Until then, the Russian leadership can 
still make concessions and counter the 
remaining protests with the power of the 
state media and by repressing opposition. 
The stability of the Russian regime is not 
directly threatened by this current loss of 
confidence. Nevertheless, the reform is 
likely to cause mute dissatisfaction among 
the population. After a lost decade for the 
Russian economy, the Kremlin lacks the 
means to regain the confidence it has lost. 
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